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Lt. Col. John Gomersall's Napoleonic War

Chapter 31

Massena's Retreat to Santarem
Nov 1810 to March 1811

The two armies faced each other across the 'Lines' for a month until on November 14th under cover of a heavy mist Massena withdrew north to a safer defensive position at Santarem. The Lines had proved too strong for him to countenance a frontal attack but he did consider that an eventual flanking move down the Tagus might be feasible.
Once again Crauford’s Light Division and Pack’s Brigade were at the forefront of Wellington’s advance in pursuit of Massena. Pack’s orders on the 15th November were to march the next day through Sobral and Alemquer to join the Light Division in the neighbourhood of Villa Nova and on the 18th Wellington was planning to attack what he thought was Massena’s rear guard as the following memorandum illustrates:
Santarem
“If the enemy should remain tomorrow morning in the position he now occupies at and in front of Santarem, he is to be attacked as follows. Br Genl Packs Brigade with Lt Col Elders Battalion & half of the Brigade of Portugese 3 Pounders will form the left of the attack. This Column will have its Light Infantry in front, & will be supported by two squadrons of cavalry & will cross the two streams at the bridges reconnoitred today by Lt Col Elder and Br Genl Pack will drive in the Enemy’s Posts on the heights between the Rivulets of the Great Hill of Santarem and will thereafter and if possible prevent the Enemy’s communication by the Great Road, with his advanced Corps at the End of the causeway.
Br Genl Pack will move with his Right in front & he will march before day light, in order to be at the Point where he is to cross the Rivulet, by the time the Head of Sir Brent Spencer’s Column will have arrived near the out Posts at present occupied by the Light Division on the Great Road.
Br Genl Pack will communicate by his Right with the centre attack. The right of the attack is to be formed by Col Wynchs Brigade with Capt Ross’ Troop of Horse Artillery and two Squadrons of Dragoons. The other brigade of the Light Division and Two squadrons of Dragoons are to be in Reserve in support of this attack. This column is to take the same Road that was followed to day by the Patrol of Cavalry under Lt Col Hervey & it will begin to cross the Rivulet nearly at the same time that the Column under Br Genl Pack begins to cross it higher up. He will move on by the Road, followed today by the cavalry Patrol until it arrives on the Height, in Rear of that occupied by the Enemy’s Advanced Guard & between it and the Great Hill of Santarem; this column will march by its Right.
The above movements together with the advance of Lt Genl Sir Brent Spencer’s Column along the high road will probably occasion the Retreat of the Enemy’s advanced Guard. Or if not Sir Brent Spencer will be enabled, to attack the height which it occupies, without the risk of sustaining any great loss.
Sir Brent Spencer will move against the Enemy along the causeway, in Column; the Brigade of Infantry marching by their left, the Brigade of Artillery, will accompany the Column.
Sir Brent Spencer will leave one Brigade of his Division, together with the German Legion in reserve on the Heights at this End of the causeway. Half the Brigade of Portugese 3 Pounders is to be attached to this Reserve.
As soon as the Enemy’s advanced Guard retires, Col Wynch’s Brigade will form on the Height behind that ashief? it has quitted, throwing the left of the Brigade towards the Great Road & communicating by the left with
Santarem
Sir Brent Spencer’s Division. Sir Brent Spencer’s Division after having passed the causeway will form in Columns of Battalions left in front.
Br General Pack’s Corps will be formed at the same time, at some distance to the left of the 1st Division.
From this situation a further Distribution will be made for the attack of the Great Hill of Santarem.
The Cavalry (with the exception of the Squadrons allotted as above) and Captain Bulls Troop of Horse Artillery are to be in Reserve on the right and left of the High Road on this side the causeway, the Cavalry in Columns of Regiments.
M Genl Anson’s Brigade of cavalry has already been directed to patrol the Road which ………. from Rio Mayor to Santarem. The Brigade is to be put in motion along that Road at day break tomorrow Morning. It has to communicate by the right with Br Genl Pack as soon as the latter has crossed the Rivulet.”
(signed)
Geo Murray

Cartaxo
Nov 18th 1810

However, heavy rain prevented the action and subsequently Wellington found that his intelligence was incorrect and that in fact Massena had his entire army at Santarem and had he attacked he would have risked serious defeat.

Marmeleira
On 24th November Wellington ordered his troops to draw back and he established his army winter headquarters at Cartaxo with the whole army cantoned in the adjacent villages except for the 5th Division which remained at Torres Vedras and Craufords Light Division, Pack’s Portuguese Brigade and Anson’s cavalry which as an advance guard were left in touch with the French. Hill and Hamilton remained south of the Tagus. Pack’s Brigade and the Light Division remained in front of the French forces at Santarem until the following March. Crauford took the opportunity to take some home leave and was not back in the Peninsular until the following May. His place was taken temporarily by Major General Sir William Erskine, whose reputation for incompetence and occasional bouts of insanity, led him to be cashiered from the army in 1812. He eventually committed suicide in Lisbon in 1813, by jumping out of a window. Massena in December 1810 was in a most difficult position. Wellington’s strategy which he had successfully kept secret
had been to construct the defensive lines around Lisbon, a work he commenced a year earlier in October 1809; to train the Portuguese army to a level that they could be integrated into an allied fighting force; to train and organise the Portuguese Militia to operate behind the enemy lines; and to put into effect a scorched earth policy in front of the advancing enemy so that they had very little to survive on from the land they occupied. In addition, thanks to the Royal Navy, he had secure supply lines, communications with England, and continuing reinforcements, such that by March 1811 he had 43,000 troops in the field not including the militia. Massena on the other hand was isolated and his power diminishing. His communications with France were through hostile and guerrilla infested Portugal and Spain such that when he sent messages to France it required an escort of battalion strength together with dragoons. He had entered Portugal in August with 65,000 men but by December was down to 47,000 and those were underfed and demoralised. In addition, what orders he did receive from Napoleon were often misguided and unrealistic. So it was to a large degree inevitable that Massena should eventually retreat which he did on 6th March 1811 after 5 months in front of the ‘Lines’.
Massena remained at Santarem for the next 3 months with Wellington in close touch on the north of the Tagus and General Hill to the south of the Tagus guarding against the French crossing and trying an outflanking movement. However, Hill was taken seriously ill with fever at the end of November and was replaced by Beresford who commanded a semi independent corps south of the Tagus until Hill’s return in June 1811. It is possible that this change in command had a negative effect upon the organisation of the Portuguese forces, who suffered badly from shortages of provisions during the advance in March 1811.
The disposition of the allied forces in front of Santarem was as follows: The three British cavalry brigades formed a line at the front, reaching from Porto de Mugem on the Tagus to Sao Joao de Ribiera on the upper Rio Mayor. The infantry Divisions (apart from the 2nd Division) were arranged in successive lines of cantonment behind them, watching the course of the Rio Mayor, while the reserves had retired as
Assentiz
far as the Lines of Torres Vedras. On the right near the Tagus, lay the Light Division, immediately in front of Santarem, quartered in Valle and other villages. On the left the front line was formed by Pack’s Portuguese who lay at Almoster, Marmaleira and Assentiz with 2 or 3 companies at Joao Ribeira on the heights overlooking the middle course of the Rio Mayor. In support of the Light Division, but five miles to the rear, at Cartaxo and other places, was the large and powerful 1st Division, 7,000 bayonets. The 4th Division lay at an equal distance behind the 1st, at Azambuja and Aveiras da Cima. Behind Pack, on the inland or Leira road, Picton and his 3rd Division were placed at Alcoentre. Their support was the 5th Division at Torres Vedras in the old Lines, seventeen miles to the rear, from which a circuitous road led to Alcoentre. Finally, the newly formed 6th Division was placed at the other end of the Lines, but just outside them, at Alemquer and Arruda, with Le Cor’s Portuguese Division, immediately behind at Alhandra.
Maps
  1 Portugal, Spain and Southern France
  2 Central Portugal
  7 Movements of the 16th Portuguese Regiment - 16th November 1810 to 21st March 1811
Photos
Back Almoster Almoster
Back Assentiz Assentiz
Back Cartaxo Cartaxo
Back Marmeleira Marmeleira Marmeleira
Back San Joao de Ribeira San Joao de Ribeira
Back Santarem The walls of Santarem The Tagus from the heights of Santarem The walls of Santarem The walls of Santarem


 

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